Released an MIT-licensed .NET library for attribute-driven, group-aware async scheduling. You mark methods with [ScheduleGroup]; a build-time IL weaver injects scheduling so callers keep normal await. One NuGet brings runtime + analyzers + weaver (no Fody).

Repo: https://github.com/ChronosDevZero/grouped-scheduling

NuGet: https://www.nuget.org/packages/GroupedScheduling.Build

Happy to take feedback from other OSS maintainers.

Hey everyone! I’ve been working on Snapback, a DIY instant replay project built around a Raspberry Pi 5.

It keeps a rolling buffer of video and audio from an HDMI capture device. When something happens that you wish you’d recorded, grab your phone and save the last 30 seconds, or take a screenshot.

Everything runs locally on your network, with no cloud service or account required. I built it with gaming in mind, but it can also work with compatible HDMI cameras and computer output.

• Source code and setup instructions
• Website

I’m sharing it now because I’d love feedback from people who enjoy building things like this. Curious what you’d use it for, what hardware you’d try, and what could make setup easier.

Thanks for taking a look!

I’d love feedback, ideas, or contributions. If nothing else, a star on GitHub would mean a lot and help others find the project. Thanks for taking a look!

The security of open source applications was already criticized enough before AI, but now legitimate concerns can be made. The effect is not as pronounced as it will be in the future, since many stable projects still have enough "manual" developers left on their team to reasonably understand the submissions that are being made. But what happens when vibe coders start to take over these apps? How can those that do not understand the code that is being submitted reasonably validate that malware is not being added? It would be trivial for a state actor to mask malware and get it past a reviewer that has little to no understanding of the language itself (even if it takes multiple submissions).

Several of these viral vibe coded apps have hundreds of contributors and are merging large PRs at a pace that simply does not allow for a proper analysis to occur (security or otherwise). It's more like, "test merge the code", "looks like it fixes the problem", "approve PR". How can companies, or individuals for that matter, that are concerned about the security and integrity of their systems ever use these applications?

I know the some will say, "run it in a VM" or "it's your choice to download it", but those aren't practical solutions. All it will take is a few high profile security incidents with these apps for people to start questioning the open source model with vibe coding.

I hate "Ctrl+tab" on chrome, I'm used to Alt+Tab on windows, so I brought it to browsers. You just click Alt+Q and you see all your tabs, across windows with previews and quick actions.

Tabatha is an MIT-licensed tab switcher for Chrome. Its content security policy is `connect-src 'none'`: it cannot send anything anywhere, which was the whole point.

That made one thing hard: knowing what goes wrong. My answer so far:
- The Chrome Web Store dashboard (installs, weekly users, languages)
- An uninstall page on the website with an optional form. The extension only opens links; anything typed goes through the site, never the extension
- GitHub issues and Reddit comments

It worked: the top uninstall answer ("previews missing or blank") turned into the main change in 1.3.5.

Extension: Chrome Web Store

I would love if people use it and give their feedbacks, on new features, how to be privacy-first, or anything you feel.