From my understanding, Chalmer's P-Zombie was meant to be an argument against physicalism explaining how one can have all the physical activity of a conscious being without needing qualia, yet it's undisputed according to him we have qualia.

My question is that since we can only ever access our own qualia, how can we know for sure others aren't potentially P-Zombies? I say for sure it seems unanimous that there's no P-Zombies among us by philosophers and especially those in the field of consciousness.

I know Chalmer's answer was Psychophysical Laws and how all correlation must accompany the accompanied qualia, yet I wonder if one were to question physical activity if one can use that to be skeptical?

I know this sounds like the Problem of Others Minds, which base on what I read it was an interesting thought experiment before which many don't really question other minds exist and seems largely not seen as a problem as we further the mind. And I also know the different arguments on the plausibility of P-Zombies metaphysically and even nomologically reading some of the sources from Stanford Encyclopedia.

And I'm aware this sounds like solipisism which has it's own problems that the question of P-Zombies seems irrelevant.

I'm not saying P-Zombies walk among us, but I also know that I'm missing something to have the same certainty many in the field clearly exhibit.

Has some philosopher ever looked at the mechanism of choice up close and decided if free will exists or not? Maybe a phenomenologist?

Imagine a machine, this machine gives you pure bliss. All the heroin and orgasms and food your senses can handle. A heavenly Sodom and Gemorrah. But, for one man to use their copy of the machine, other men have to suffer. Perhaps it needs the blood of children, perhaps the poor have to work in dangerous conditions to feed the machine, the specifics do not matter. What matters is that this machine is so amazing at producing utility, it always produces more utility than is lost. On what grounds could a Utilitarian call this evil and disturbing? And how can we apply this to real life like first world nations exploiting third worlders, such as your clothes or phone being made be kids?

Not sure if philosophy is the right place to insert this question in. Humans are an evolution from primitive cells and things that are usually considered 'natural'. Going by the same you can say that we are 'natural'. We consider an anthill natural because it is made by 'natural' causes. Using the same analogy, even the buildings we make, the books we write and everything considered 'artificial' or 'man-made' is natural.I may be wrong at any point making the whole thing fall on its own head and if I am please correct me. Thank you!

Preferably something appropriate for a lay person.

What exactly is metalogic?

How can I improve myself in this topic?

From what I understand (and tbh I could be wrong) a fetish is an object or some sort of commodity that obscures the existence of the hands that touched it previously, the laborers/workers necessary for it to exist.

However, I’m trying to describe something that REVEALS the existence of the hands/people that touched it. Like: a fingerprint on a ceramic pot, a coin that’s been rubbed smooth, a wooden beam that’s still got pencil marks.

Is there a word or phrase (preferably based in existing philosophical material) that encapsulates this idea?

Thank you very much!

I only know of Philosophy books in my native language but I’d like to know those of other countries’ must-read books as well. Could be anything and not just in the academe, well I’m really interested in majoring despite the employment scare lol. I would also love to expand my knowledge about it.

Thanks in advance!

Hi everyone! I’m a design student (not a physicist, so please bear with me) working on a university research project about the concept of “non-places” and “non-space”. Most of what I’ve found comes from philosophy, architecture and anthropology, and I’d like to understand how physics approaches the same ideas.

These are the questions I’m stuck on:

1. Does space exist on its own, even if there were no matter in it, or is space just a way of describing the relations between objects (the old Newton vs Leibniz debate)?
2. Is “empty space” really empty? I’ve seen mentions of the quantum vacuum and the Casimir effect but I don’t understand them.
3. Some physicists suggest space might not be fundamental but “emergent”. What does that mean in simple terms?

If you can point me to accessible books, articles or lectures (I don’t have a strong math background), I’d be really grateful. And if my questions are badly phrased or based on wrong assumptions, please tell me, that’s useful too!

Thanks in advance!

Now, this is a common question, my apologies, but I'm a teenager and wanna get into philosophy, but what's the best book to get into philosophy before going into singular philosophies. Something like an intro to everything, I got a bit overwhelmed by so many suggestions on the wiki. Much appreciated everyone.

Has any philosopher throughout history explicitly denied that the principle of non-contradiction (PNC) is intuitively compelling or self-evident to the intellect? I'm not asking whether the PNC is intuitively compelling or self-evident to the intellect?

I'm not asking whether the PNC is logically or ontologically true, or whether philosophers have rejected its universal validity.

I'm asking specifically whether any philosopher has denied its immediate intuitive compellingness, regardless of its truth.

If so, could you provide references to their actual writings?

I have been rereading Derrida's "Force and Significance" paper and am puzzled by the use of "weakness" therein. From what I have noted (I may have missed another example) it occurs in two sections.

First, in the introductory comments, where he writes "The force of our weakness is that impotence separates, disengages, and emancipates. Henceforth the totality is more clearly perceived, the panorama and the panoramagram are possible" (p. 5, Writing and Difference 1978 edition).

Second, in the midst of what I call the conclusion. This is where my confusion really comes from. The first use occurs during the brief discussion of the metaphor of light and dark, "Which suffices to say that the metaphor of the 'fall' deserves its quotation marks. In this heliocentric metaphysics, force, ceding its place to edits (i.e. the form which is visible for the metaphorical eye), has already been separated from itself in acoustics. How can force or weakness be understood in terms of light and dark" (p. 27, same edition) Slightly lower down, while discussion Husserl, he asks the following question "And why the force of weakness which dissimulates in the very act by which it reveals? If this 'dialectic' of force and weakness is the finitude of thought itself in its relationship to Being, it can only be articulated in the language of form, through images of shadow and light" (27-28, same edition).

Where does this idea of weakness come from? Is it a specific reference to one of the texts? Is it an oddity of the English translation?

In the two cases that are examined, weakness seems to me inconsequential. In the first case, Derrida is combining reflections on the nature of metaphysics drawn from Plato's Republic and (I think) Boethius. The explanatory note simply links all this to the metaphysics of presence which Derrida would later critique. However, where is weakness in this discussion. Would weakness be light or dark (on the next page, he implies that force is darkness, but leaves weakness inaccessible). Would weakness be the weakness of the man who leaves the cave, or the weakness of the men who stay within it? Further down, in the discussion of Husserl, the "force of weakness" seems to refer simply to failure. Is there a failure implicit in the "heliocentric metaphysics?" He seems to want to say that this is a reduction from the dialectic (or perhaps constitutive negation) of force and writing that he proposes at the top of page 27, but I don't see a connection.

Alternatively, is weakness a non-specialized usage in this case?

Is there another Derrida essay that is more directly about weakness that could be helpful for illuminating this problem?