In planning for Operation Barbarossa, the Germans planned for the limit of their advance to be the A-A line, roughly from Arkhangelsk to Astrakhan. While part of this line was defended by the Volga River, much of this line was not anchored on any geographic features of significance

However, "just" a few hundred kilometers further East was such a feature that would cover almost the entire front, with the exception of the semi-desert of the Kazak steppe - the Ural Mountains. An eventual line based on the Urals would also capture significant Soviet industrial centers, and put many others within bomber range

Obviously none of this ended up mattering - but why was the furthest limit of the Nazi advance expected to be the fairly arbitrary A-A line, vs the Urals?

I understand why normal infantry in dedicated ships took the lead, amphibious assaults became a lot larger and needed a lot more specialised equipment, while sailor landing parties couldn't really sustain themselves for more than a few days on land and lacked heavy equipment.

but what was the downside in having a few extra battalions or regiments of infantry to help with the first few days of a landing when integrated within the combined arms systems of larger army/marine dominated landing force that meant they seemingly very suddenly just stopped being a thing?

For example, the Arleigh Burkes are close enough to the same weight as a Ticonderoga class cruiser.

I guess some of it could be the nitpicking of what's a "heavy destroyer" versus a "light cruiser".

Since the 41st was the only Royal Marine that fought during the Korean War, where they raided the North Korean coast with the Republic of Korea Marine Corps, I wonder what prevented the ROKMC forming a unit similar to the commandos?

I do know that they were base on the USMC but surely there would have been an attempt.

It is probably both but which influences the other one more substantially? For example in WW2 trench warfare is much less dominant than WW1, this is a result of developments in mechanised forces with radios, airborne forces, and artillery. However are these advancements made with the goal of counteracting trench warfare in mind, or are they natural results of increased productivity and scientific findings which caused trench warfare to be outdated?

Having recently seen reports of Chinese mining using EV dump trucks with exchangeable batteries, the question has been drifting around my head.

What impact will solid state batteries and Heavy weight EVs have on warfare ?

If a Tank is an EV, does that make it harder to spot on thermals ? But easier to disable ?

Will supply chains utilize electric trucks ?

Will we see rapid deployment solar grids for battery charging ?

He thought that they were redundant and that the army had the same mission. Was he right?

The army as an organization is very strict, you could say authoritarian, with a very clear vertical hierarchy. Even in the armed forces of the most democratic and progressive nations, I believe the model remains the same. And in time of a great war, nations start mobilization and use forced conscription, which represses the freedom of conscripts to protect the freedom of the whole society. And even in peacetime, it's a very particular career with lots of limitations and shortcomings compared to the private sector. So, to put it shortly, if you are a guy from a developed democratic nation, army service fucking sucks comes in sharp contrast with what you usually have in such a society. In contrast, I remember in Orwell's Homage to Catalonia he describes the militia in which he served as exactly the opposite – egalitarian, volunteer, non-repressive, with officers who were all down to earth. But his militia was poorly equipped and trained, and after a short time was purged by their own Stalinist allies. So, I have a question. Is it possible to have effective non-repressive armed forces?

Say, you have a tank or combat engineer battalion, and each of the companies gets attached to a separate formation to support it. What happens to the HQ and whatever is left of the BN? What is the role of the CO in that case?

And by that i mean, if it had been used in battle against other navies at the time, would it have been able to fight effectively and defend itself? Would it be very coordinated? Or was it nothing more than a shiny paper tiger?

Im specifically asking about how effective it was as a fighting force compared to its peers, i understand that fighting is only a small part of what navies actually do, but in this case i am asking about their combative capability compared to other navies at the time

Note: I realize that some of the secondary guns listed are dual purpose and some of them are not so I don't mean that it's a "well you're comparing apples and oranges" - it's more of a general discussion on logistics of ammunition types.

Edit: when I say secondary guns, I mean secondary guns for BBs and main guns for destroyers and cruisers.

US Navy:

Main guns of BBs from battleship not scrapped after WW1 to WW2:

• 14 inch - Standards
• 16 inch - North Carolina, South Dakota, and Iowa classes

Secondary guns on BBs or main armament on cruisers and destroyers:

• 4 inch
• 5 inch
• 6 inch
• 8 inch

Royal Navy:

Main guns of BBs is less of an issue as the QEs/Renowns/R-Class were WW1 vintage and the KGVs were matching the Washington Naval Treaty:

• 14 inch - King George V class
• 15 inch - Queen Elizabeth class, Renown class, R-class, Hood, Vanugard
• 16 inch - Nelson class

Secondary guns on BBs or main armament on cruisers and destroyers could be any of the below:

• 4 inch
• 4.5 inch
• 4.7 inch
• 5.25 inch
• 6 inch
• 8 inch
• Possibly forgetting others.

In terms of the Royal Navy, I'll just make the comment that when you are the biggest navy in the world (or one of the biggest at the end of WW2), you can afford to take on inefficiencies in logistics if it means you can kill your enemy better and faster. The American side seems to be more focused on standardization than the British - especially during WW2 where anything new that floated had a good chance of having a 5 inch/38 on it. But in fairness to the British at least for Vanguard, they used the same 5.25 inch DP gun mounts as the King George V class.

I'm reading a book about the WW1 battles of Champagne and Artois in 1915 right now. Where the French and British offensives failed to do much despite massive investment of men and shells.

One of the things mentioned is that the Germans used reverse slope defenses. Now I read the wiki article about it, but I'm curious how this worked in general.

I can understand, especially in WW1 how it helps you, since it would be a lot harder to shell a trench you can't see in this era,but how else would it work? I mean normally you'd not want to concede high ground (the crest) to the enemy right?

So would the Germans just sit there and wait until the attackers crest the hill and then gun them down?

What about in more recent times, is this still a good idea?

I'm not going to include any escort carriers or anything after 1943 because it's a bit academic at that point.

• USS Lexington - May 1942 - Battle of the Coral Sea
• USS Yorktown - June 1942 - Battle of Midway
• USS Wasp - September 1942 - Guadalcanal
• USS Hornet - October 1942 - Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands

Edit: I guess another way of asking is which fleet carrier loss hurt the US navy the most during the early pacific campaign?

Double edit: maybe the wording should be strategically significant

I am looking for books on British military actions during the fall of the Empire but BEFORE the Falkland Wars. Any suggestions?

According to wiki, pieces such as the Flak 16 and even older ones like the French 75 being put on high elevation mounts could shoot more than 4000 meters high. Due to that i began wondering what chances would a slow flying, relatively low altitude bomber have against such guns?

I know that WW1 AA fire was generally not very effective, but I would like to understand why exactly, beyond "the gun doesnt shoot high enough".

I imagine its a mix of not enough guns, difficult use (since some versions of the 75 AA required a lot of time to prepare for firing), and targets for bombing not being very predictable? This has zero sources but i emjoy guessing

Do note this is not a question of the feasibility of military jet-skis. The issues with jet-skis in a military setting are many and if they were effective then we'd be seeing their deployment as good ideas spread as quickly as bad ones. However as fans of military history, we all know that a bad idea has never stopped military theorists before. Especially for use in littoral, archipelago and delta environments where you can see how an argument could be made on paper for roles such as patrolling, reconnaissance and raiding where a jet-skis small size and speed would be more advantageous.

I'm excluding more law enforcement/civillian leaning uses of jet-skis from this question such as SAR even if used by a military and focusing much more on overtly military minded applications.

I do know that the Kraka jet-ski is apparently used by US special forces. I say apparently because every article I've read about it says the Kraka is used by US special forces but all fail to mention which ones or when it was adopted. None of the articles even mention SOCOM or any US military branch and in some articles special forces is capitalised and in others it's not so I'm unsure if special forces is refering to US Army Special Forces or using the term in the colloquial sense. Doesn't help that all the artcles read more like advertising for the manufacturer rather than reporting on actual military procurement so I'm pretty iffy on if this is true or not. If anyone has any information on that then please feel free to share. However even of it is true, while I suppose it's technically a jet-ski, from what I can gather it's more of an evolution of the RHIB rather than a more traditionally designed jet-ski which is what thinking about with this question.

So does anyone know of any proposals, plans or attempts to employ military jet-skis?

Occasionally I will see discussion online about how counter insurgency doctrine has advanced over time. Obviously the tools are completely different in the 2020s even compared to the 2000s not to mention the 1960s or earlier. But does modern doctrine and equipment really result in better outcomes against insurgents? Or is it a question of political will and resource dedication more so than the specific tactics and equipment?

So it’s the first smokeless powder rifle, with a tube capacity of 10 rounds. What were French generals/logisticians expecting with this? Why did they adopt it and why was smokeless powder so important in their doing so?

Also: It has a really complex and weird loading process. Did this affect their decisions in any way?