Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, outside of Pripyat. Abandoned villages, agricultural facilities and equipment, dead forests, wildlife...

Video here : https://youtu.be/mIpCXnhrYmM

Exclusion Zone

(not fully accurate)

Viktor Mikhailovich Degtyarenko was born on the 10th of August, 1954 in Ryazan Oblast. His family moved to Chernobyl in 1969 when Degtyarenko was 15 years old. He started his work at ChNPP on the 13th of August, 1984 as mechanical engineer first in the electrical shop, and later as an operator of the main circulation pumps in the reactor shop No. 2 of the 4th power unit.

On the night of April 26, 1986, Degtyarenko was working the night shift in the North Main Circulation Pump Hall with his colleagues, Valeriy Khodemchuk and Gennady Rusanovskiy. They were instructed to go out of the Pump Hall into the Perlite and Reagent Preperation Room, Room 419. Khodemchuk went back to fix something on the 22nd pump, while Degtyarenko and Rusanovskiy stayed back. There was a sudden surge of power after Operator Leonid Toptunov pressed the AZ-5 button. An explosion ripped through the reactor hall and collapsed the roof of the Pump Hall, killing Khodemchuk immediately. Steam Pipes ruptured, scalding Degtyarenko and Rusanovskiy. Degtyarenko ran all the way to the Control Room of the 3rd Unit where Yuvchenko found him, dazed and his face scalded.

He was evacuated and admitted to the 6th Moscow Hospital, with a radiation dose of 4-5 sieverts. He fell into a coma on the 9th of May, succumbing to his injuries on 19th of May, 1986. He was posthumously awarded the Order For Courage.

Exclusion Zone

Does anyone know?

All of this had such an irregular, sudden quality. On the one hand, it could be explained by the young age of this branch of technology, and to some extent it is; but on the other hand, it was a reflection of an overall incorrect manner of working in general. When Nikolai Ivanovich spoke his words, and they, like a light, retrospectively illuminated all the previous events, I realised that these were the right words. But I also realised that this was not specific to the nuclear energy industry, but rather the consequence of the way work was organized in general, to create, very quickly create, a new branch of technology that the national economy needs. 
Here’s a way to organize work on construction sites: inconsistency in different types of production, say, the production of fuel elements; the machine-building equipment, the unpreparedness of builders to accept this equipment on time; garbage on construction sites; constant, incomprehensible changes in the number of construction staff (by construction I mean at nuclear power plants), at times too many, at others too few. Work, so to say, is progressing on the station, then abruptly stops because one or the other equipment is not there. 
All this taken together was very unpleasant, and at the same time, hardly unique or specific to the nuclear energy industry alone. That is why the words of Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov should be understood in a much wider context. And when I visited the Chernobyl station after the accident and saw what was happening there, I myself drew a precise and unequivocal conclusion, that the Chernobyl disaster is an apotheosis, the pinnacle of all the mismanagement that has been carried out for decades in our country. 
Of course, what happened at Chernobyl has real, not abstract, culprits to blame. We already know now that the reactor’s Protection Control System (PCS) had a defect in it, and many scientists knew this, and they proposed ways to fix this defect. The Chief Designer, not wanting to do, so to say, quick, additional work, was in no hurry to change the Protection Control System. 
Also, there are, of course, specific culprits. What went on at the Chernobyl station itself for many years: conducting, so to say, experiments the plans for which were made very carelessly and sloppily. Before conducting the experiments, there were no simulations of possible situations, that is the situations were not walked through—what will happen if there is a protection malfunction; what will happen if the process does not execute as planned; how should the staff react in one situation or the other; can the reactor be left running when the steam supply to the turbine is stopped; and if this is done, what could happen; what will happen if the main circulation pumps are switched on.

Bro wut, why is it unit 3 not unit 4?