Our CSPM rollout is blocking developers from shipping because a test bucket with no data now needs a full incident response ceremony. We wanted guardrails, apparently we got a committee in CI.

Been looking at Orca for this, mainly because it scans IaC on the PR but only flags new problems the change introduced, so devs aren't gated on stuff that was already there. How are you tuning this without disabling everything? 🙂

company trying improve security posture, we doing poc with sweet security and upwind, also looked at wiz. main focus for us is ai agent security, not so much the rest of cnapp stuff

what we care most is catching agent doing something it shouldnt, like unexpected tool call or api access, agent reading data it not supposed to, or agent with way too much permission. prompt injection also but more interested what happen after, when agent actually act on it

For the longest time our shipping process was the same. as we Build the agent, red team it internally, test every scenario we could think of, then ship. We thought we were thorough.

Then we did a demo with alice and it broke the agent inside the first few minutes. Several critical issues we had missed entirely. Not exotic stuff either. An injection through a path we never considered, data extraction, a chain that made the agent misuse its own tools. All channels that never made our list because we only tested what we already knew.

That comprehensiveness is what got me. They ran through more scenarios in a few minutes than our whole internal pass covered in a week.

The lesson took a while to sink in. Internal red teaming is good for the threats you can imagine. The attacks that actually get exploited are the ones you never thought to put on the list.

So the list is the thing. Injections, data extraction, tool misuse, off-policy behavior. If it isnt on the list before launch, it becomes a surprise in production.

Thats what I would tell anyone shipping an agent. Learn from my mistake before it bites you.

Managing Windows devices becomes more challenging when employees work remotely or use devices outside the company network.

IT and security teams need to make sure devices stay updated, security settings remain consistent, and users don't install or access unauthorized applications.

Some important areas to consider are:

• Keeping Windows devices patched
• Enforcing security policies
• Managing application access
• Checking device compliance
• Securing devices outside the office network
• Identifying devices with outdated settings

Windows MDM can help IT teams manage many of these tasks from a central platform, but device management alone is not a replacement for endpoint protection or other security controls.

For those working in security, how do you manage Windows endpoint policies across remote devices? Are built-in Windows tools enough for your environment, or does a dedicated MDM platform make things easier?

Every monday a slide goes to the security steering group with patch compliance on it. Critical patches applied within 14 days, 97% give or take, for about a year. Nobody asks about it anymore, which should have been the warning.

Last month an IR ticket landed on a sales laptop running a browser four versions behind. I went to check it in SCCM and it wasnt there. The regional office images its own machines and never enrolled them. So the 97% is 97% of what SCCM knows about, and SCCM is the one building the slide.

AD, the EDR, intune and SCCM all feed our axonius, so I built the denominator there instead. Every device any of those sources reports, then the ones SCCM has. 2,140 out of about 2,600. Our real number is closer to 97% of 82%.

That isnt clean either. A chunk of the gap is stale AD objects for machines that died years ago, and they count until someone deletes them. Anything none of those four has seen isnt in there at all.

The regional office gets enrolled in SCCM over the next few weeks, which closes the part of the gap thats real. Until then the slide says what the 97% is out of.

Our monitor-mode rules flag hundreds of false positives a day because loyalty IDs look like card numbers. I own DLP at a US retailer, about 3,000 staff. Purview in Edge is decent but marketing lives in Chrome and a few teams are on Macs, so I am weighing Chrome Enterprise Premium against a dedicated tool that covers both browsers with one policy. For now the alerts are crying wolf. Where did you land?

My boss has challenged me to cut down the tier 1 queue without adding headcount.

We manage Windows devices through Intune and the RMM side is pretty standard.

One idea he mentioned was an autonomous IT platform that handles the routine stuff on its own (password resets, reboots, basic troubleshooting), then notifies the user with something like "We noticed X issue with your laptop and automatically resolved it."

I know there are tools like Ansible and other automation platforms, but not every task has a playbook ready to go, especially when troubleshooting something unexpected.

Atera came up because the IT Autopilot stuff is built into the RMM/helpdesk, NinjaOne came up too. Can any of these do this without giving the AI agent the keys to the kingdom?

I'm curious how you guys handle this in your environments. Is most of your routine work already automated, or do you still spend a fair amount of time fixing things manually?

Would love to hear what's actually working!

In May 2017, WannaCry tore through hospitals, factories and railways using a Windows flaw Microsoft had already patched. Then a 22-year-old researcher slowed it down by registering a $10.69 domain name.

I run a small, faceless channel called Kill Switch Stories that retells real cyberattacks as true stories, then explains the simple habits that would have stopped them. Episode 1 covers WannaCry (about 8.5 minutes, every claim sourced in the description): https://youtu.be/kt2uvKR8tXE

Tomorrow's episode: Colonial Pipeline, where one old VPN password with no second factor shut down America's biggest fuel pipeline.

Curious what you all think. Is "the patch already existed" still the biggest lesson from WannaCry, or is it something else?

hello community

been building this thing for a while now and finally made it public. basically an AI hackbot that automates the whole vuln-finding + web CTF process. free and open source, no catch.

some results so far — it solved 60+ CTF tasks on its own, mostly web, and a few hard ones too (still kinda surprised at that ngl). also found 3 confirmed vulns on targets i had permission to test. repo’s got a bunch of other stuff but web pentesting + CTFs is where it actually shines.

i know there’s already a ton of agents out there so “yet another hackbot” i get it lol. but the approach here is a bit different — instead of the usual agent loop, RedBox models the attack as a relational graph. it tracks a “hypothesis” from the very first signal all the way to validation, using belief graphs + conditional structures + validation formulas to decide what’s actually worth chasing and when a finding is legit. the whole point was to let even a small/free model converge to a reliable result while cutting false positives and hallucinations. it also keeps a memory of past runs so it gets stronger every time you run it.

anyway i’d genuinely love for people to go check it out, break it, roast it, whatever. and im super down to talk architecture or take contributors if anyone’s interested.

repo: https://github.com/H3DD4/RedBox

Hello everyone,

I am a researcher looking for an arXiv endorsement in the Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) category to submit my latest paper.

• Paper Title: A Comparative Evaluation of LLM-Based Cybersecurity Analysis:

Mistral-7B, Llama3.2, andLily-Cybersecurity on Live IDS Data

and Benchmark Datasets

• Field: Cybersecurity / cs.CR

To protect the confidentiality and intellectual property of the research, the abstract, GitHub link or the full draft are available.

If you are an eligible endorser in the cs.CR category and willing to help, please comment below or send me a DM. I would be glad to share the abstract and the full paper draft with you privately for review.

Thank you so much for your time and support!

Hello!
Job position available: Saturdays full day permanent position 16 hour shift from 6:30am-10:30pm at 146 Liberty Street South Bowmanville ON
Phone number: 905-623-7790
Other days also needed. Experience in gas station preferred.

Ran into this last week while updating a couple recipe posts. I fed a generator a prompt for a new herb mix and the output looked fine until I tried uploading the draft. The site blocked it with a modsecurity rule on one line. Switched models and the same thing happened with different text. The phrases don't look like attacks to me, but they match whatever word order the rules are set to catch. Manual cleanup didn't help since the next run just created new strings that tripped the same rules. Wondering how often this happens with normal writing and if anyone found a fast way to strip whatever the WAF is actually looking for.

Their main worry is agents being talked into "authorized-looking" actions. The framing that stood out: the main risk isn't the model making a mistake; it's an attacker instructing the agent to do something that looks authorized. Their approach is defense in depth: monitoring, auditing, guardrails, and a kill switch to shut down a misbehaving model.

Also in the piece: TII's CEO says an agent you can't monitor in real time "is malware that got access to your machine," and that non-human agents need clear identities. Kaspersky describes "living off local agents," where attackers use an agent already on the machine to find valuable data.

Source: www.khaleejtimes.com/business/tech/ai-agents-tricked-accessing-sensitive-government-data-cybersecurity

For those running agents in production: do your agents have their own identities and least-privilege scopes, or do they inherit a user's or service account's permissions? And who owns the kill switch?

I mean I understand that they were outdated and that someone figured out a way to exploit them, but shouldn't they be exposed on a local network. I guess that the attacker was suitably positioned.

Does any one has more info about this story ?