President Donald Trump waived massive tariffs linked to Russian energy exports mandated in a law that he signed last month, as the measures complicated his push to lower diesel prices ahead of the US midterm elections.

Trump invoked a waiver clause under the law, which was championed by the late Senator Lindsey Graham as a way to punish Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. The law also codified and expanded sanctions targeting Moscow.

“I am hereby waiving the application of such sanctions, restrictions, and duties provided for in the Graham Act. I have submitted to the Congress a certification that the issuance of such a waiver at this time is in the national interests of the United States,” Trump said in an executive order released late Friday.

The directive does formally impose the tariffs, while suspending their implementation, meaning that Trump could apply them at another time if he chooses.

The measure gave Trump 30 days to impose 100% tariffs on all goods from the top five buyers of Russian crude. It would also slap sanctions on numerous Russian entities and impose 500% tariffs on all US imports of Russian energy products. That one month deadline was set to expire on Oct. 18.

Those provisions conflict with his plan — announced last week — to work with Russian President Vladimir Putin to release the country’s diesel supplies into global markets. Trump is seeking to lower US diesel prices that are hovering at record highs weeks before the Nov. 3 elections.

Waiving the tariffs risks fresh pushback from members of Congress, including many Republicans who were outraged by his decision on Russian diesel. A bipartisan group of senators signed a letter this week demanding that Trump rescind the deal with Putin and enforce the provisions of the Graham law.

Waiving the law also avoids a potential clash with the top purchasers of Russian energy products, China, India and Turkey.

Graham, a South Carolina Republican and longtime champion of Ukraine, wrote the bill before he died in July and its passage was seen as a way of honoring him. Graham had repeatedly called such sanctions the key to bringing Putin to the negotiating table to end his full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which is in its fifth year.

Elon Musk approached Donald Trump with the idea of slowing down Starlink in Ukraine, The Telegraph can reveal.

The billionaire tech entrepreneur approached the US president with the proposal to introduce speed limits on the system, which hampered Ukraine’s drone defences, according to four sources familiar with the discussions.

One of the sources said Mr Trump “agreed” with Mr Musk’s suggestion, paving the way for the Pentagon to execute the slowdown on Starshield, the military-grade version of the satellite communications system.

Mr Musk had previously blamed Mr Trump for the chaos, claiming any changes would have been decided by the US military and ultimately the president.

At the time, Mr Trump was embroiled in a row with Volodymyr Zelensky over Ukraine’s strikes on Russian oil refineries.

US officials had warned Kyiv’s team of peace negotiators that Washington could shut off intelligence-sharing and other kinds of support if the long-range attacks were not halted.

Earlier this week, one of Mr Zelensky’s advisers said Mr Musk’s SpaceX had restricted access to the Starshield system, used by Kyiv to intercept jet-powered drones and strike behind enemy lines.

Speaking on the fringes of an EU summit in Brussels on Friday, the Ukrainian president called the slowdown a “very dangerous and unpleasant surprise”.

On Wednesday, Mr Musk denied he was responsible for limiting Starlink access, blaming the White House. He claimed that “any limits on speed or usage” were “decided by the US military and ultimately POTUS”, referring to Mr Trump.

However, after what was described as a “night of carnage” in Kyiv because of the blackout, a senior source said Mr Musk had been alarmed about the possibility of adverse consumer reaction in Europe.

The source said: “He tweeted out that he was innocent and that it was the US administration that did it. The reality is that they were both in it.”

A high-ranking European official and two well-placed Ukrainian sources confirmed this version of events.

Speaking at the White House on Friday evening, Mr Trump said he did not think ‌either ‌he ⁠nor Mr Musk had been responsible for Ukraine ⁠losing Starlink access.

On Friday, an anonymous US official, cited in a report by the AFP, insisted that Mr Trump did not make the request for a reduction of Starshield’s services for Ukraine. “No request was ever made by the president,” the US official said, after a report by Reuters claimed the decision came from the White House.

The Pentagon has not publicly explained the restrictions.

Starshield is a military-grade version of Mr Musk’s Starlink satellite network that allows pilots to stay in touch with drones moving at high speed.

The speed cap imposed on Ukraine limited drones using the Starshield system to around 160kmph, making it virtually impossible to intercept Russia’s barrages of jet-powered drones and missiles, which travel double the speed.

On Friday, Mr Zelensky said signals were being restored. He said: “Our defence ministry is in touch and my partners, they told me that there were signals from the White House that they would return these capabilities. Have they returned to the previous speed limits? No. But is it coming back now? Yes.”

It is not the first time Mr Musk has been accused of limiting the use of his Starlink platform to the detriment of Ukraine.

In 2023, he confirmed he had rebutted requests by Kyiv to use the system in drone attacks on Crimea, the peninsula illegally annexed by Russia, to avoid being complicit in a “major act of war”.

However, Mr Musk was lauded by Ukrainians earlier this year for his direct role in blocking illegal access to Starlink by Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine.

A source told The Telegraph that Poland had been leading warnings against Europe becoming too reliant on Mr Musk or his SpaceX company.

Writing on social media, Radek Sikorski, Poland’s foreign minister, warned the tech billionaire: “As your European customers, we are watching you.”

The EU is planning to have its Iris2, a Starlink replacement, operational by 2030. Mr Zelensky arrived in Brussels bruised and seeking more support from his European allies after his war of words with Mr Trump.

Diplomats said leaders had advised the Ukrainian president to tone down his criticism of his US counterpart amid fears Washington could further withdraw its support for Kyiv.

Mr Trump has been highly critical of Ukraine’s strikes on Russia’s oil refineries, blaming them for soaring energy prices before the midterm elections next month.

“All he’s doing is making the world oil price higher,” Mr Trump told the Newsmax television channel. “Well, I think that’s a disgrace.”

Last Friday, he announced a deal to lift sanctions on Russia to purchase hundreds of thousands of diesel from Vladimir Putin.

Europeans rallied around Mr Zelensky, applauding him as he entered the room for just over an hour of discussions with the EU’s prime ministers and heads of state on Friday.

The Ukrainian president later said he had heard “only support”. In the room, he told EU leaders that the war would cost some €155bn (£135bn) in 2027. “And we need at least €70 billion more from you – for defence, for weapons and for our resilience,” he told them. “This is a realistic amount.”

Mr Zelensky also hinted he would continue to defy Mr Trump’s order to halt strikes on Russian oil refineries, telling reporters that “the main rule of our operations is to respond – other things you will see”.

In a humorous moment, the Ukrainian president offered only a smirk when he was questioned by a reporter over being made a “scapegoat” for Mr Trump’s domestic problems.

“That is my answer,” Mr Zelensky said before walking off stage.

Submission Statement: Zurich prosecutors this week charged Swiss journalist Lukas Haessig with violating banking secrecy over reporting that set off a high-profile corporate criminal trial of the former ‌boss of Raiffeisen Bank Switzerland, Haessig said on his financial blog Inside Paradeplatz.

Zurich-based Inside Paradeplatz published a series of articles in 2016 about Pierin Vincenz, former CEO of Raiffeisen Bank Switzerland, and his business partner Beat Stocker, who were found guilty ⁠of fraud in April 2022

Police in June 2025 searched the blog's Zurich office and home of its founder, seizing evidence linked to suspected violation of Swiss banking law. Prosecutors had dropped the case in December 2025, but Zurich's High Court in April said a court must decide how the banking secrecy provision ‌should ⁠be interpreted after a complaint by Stocker

Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Act criminalises disclosure of confidential information leaked by bank insiders, with penalties of up to three years in prison or a fine.

Press freedom group ⁠Reporters Without Borders Switzerland called the charges troubling and said Article 47 of the Swiss banking act must not be used to prosecute journalists.

Inside ⁠Paradeplatz's reporting was clearly in the public interest, Reporters Without Borders said, adding the banking secrecy law had a chilling effect ⁠and pointing to "legal shortcomings" in Switzerland on press freedom

By Daniel Tilles

Poland will hold parliamentary elections a year from now. The outcome will decide who governs the country for the next four years – although, given how close the polls are, and with questions over coalition formation, it could also result in uncertainty, chaos, and even new elections being called.

Below, we explain how the elections work, which parties will be standing, what kind of outcomes are possible, and which issues may animate the campaign.

When will the election take place?

Assuming early elections are not called, the vote must take place on a non-working day in the last 30 days before the end of the current four-year parliamentary term, which began on 13 November 2023.

Because elections in Poland are held on Sundays, that gives four possible dates: 17, 24 or 31 October, or 7 November (though 1 November and 11 November, which are public holidays, are also theoretically possible).

It is the president, Karol Nawrocki, who will choose the date. He must do so no later than 90 days before the end of the current parliamentary term.

How does voting work?

The 460 members of the more powerful lower house, the Sejm, are elected through proportional representation, meaning that seats are distributed more or less on the basis of the share of the vote parties receive (using the so-called D’Hondt method for allocating seats from electoral lists put forward by each party). However, parties must receive at least 5% of the vote nationally to enter parliament (a figure that rises to 8% for coalitions of parties who stand on a single electoral list).

The 100 members of the upper-house Senate are chosen through a first-past-the-post system similar to how members of the US Congress or British House of Commons are elected, with the candidate in each district that receives the most votes winning the seat.

How is a government formed?

A government can only be formed if it has the support of a majority in the Sejm.

After the elections, the president designates a prime minister, who is tasked with forming a government – which would almost certainly be made up of a coalition of parties – that must then win a vote of confidence in the Sejm.

If they fail to do so (as happened in 2023), the Sejm votes to choose an alternative prime minister, who likewise must try to form a government that has the confidence of the Sejm.

If that fails, the president has a second chance to pick a prime minister, who must again win a confidence vote. If that does not work, then parliament is dissolved and new elections are called.

Who is likely to form the next government?

At the moment, it is incredibly difficult to say. Polls suggest an even split in support between parties generally aligned with Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s ruling coalition – which ranges from left to centre right – and the right-wing opposition. However, the 5% electoral threshold complicates the picture.

According to current polling averages compiled by Polish website eWybory and Politico Europe, Tusk’s centrist Civic Coalition (KO) leads with 32%. One of its coalition partners, The Left (Lewica), is on 7%, while two others, the centre-right Polish People’s Party (PSL) and centrist Poland 2050 (Polska 2050), are on around 3% and 1%, respectively. Another left-wing party, Together (Razem), which previously caucused with the ruling coalition but split in 2024, is on around 4%.

Meanwhile, the national-conservative Law and Justice (PiS), the largest opposition party, is on 20%. Two far-right opposition groups, Confederation (Konfederacja) and Confederation of the Polish Crown (KKP), have 14% and 9%, respectively. The right-wing Development Plus (Rozwój Plus), which broke away from PiS this year, is at around 5%.

If we treat those as two potential blocs, parties more or less aligned with the current government are on around 47% while the right-wing opposition is on 48%. However, PSL and Poland 2050 currently look likely to fall below the 5% threshold if they stand alone, meaning votes for them would not count. That would significantly harm Tusk’s chances of forming a new government. If Rozwój Plus stood alone and fell below the threshold, that would harm the opposition.

It is therefore likely that, as the elections draw nearer, parties that seem likely to fall below 5% will seek to join forces with other groups. In 2023, PSL and Poland 2050 stood together in the so-called Third Way (Trzecia Droga) alliance. But they have made clear they do not intend to do that again. That leaves them with limited options. They could join forces with KO on a single electoral list, but that does not guarantee that their voters will follow them. Indeed, some may baulk at voting for Tusk’s party.

Meanwhile, there are some wildcards in the pack. KKP, led by radical-right extremist Grzegorz Braun, is shunned by the mainstream right for its antisemitism, anti-Americanism and sympathy towards Russia. PiS’s leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, has declared that he would not allow Braun to join government. Development Plus has taken a similar position. Both parties value relations with the US and the Trump administration, whose ambassador to Poland has reportedly pushed them to rule out working with Braun.

However, if KKP maintains its current level of support, it looks almost impossible for the opposition to form a parliamentary majority without it, meaning there would be a strong temptation to somehow work with Braun. Kaczyński’s determination to remove Tusk from power may outweigh his dislike of Braun and desire to keep the Americans onside.

The Together party – if it manages to pass the 5% threshold – could likewise represent a challenge for Tusk when forming a coalition, given that it has criticised the government for failing to keep promises on healthcare spending, public sector pay, and liberalising the abortion law.

There also remains the possibility of some elements from each camp joining the other side – either entire parties or individual MPs defecting – in order to help form a government.

PiS has long sought to tempt PSL to its side (and recent reports suggest that even President Donald Trump tried to persuade PSL’s leader, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, to do so). It is conceivable that Rozwój Plus could work with parts of the current ruling camp, though its hatred of Tusk would make that very difficult.

All of the difficulties outlined above mean there is a significant chance that it will not be possible for anyone to form a government, necessitating fresh elections – something that has never happened before in Poland. If that happens, it would mean uncertainty and a lack of clear leadership at a time when Poland is facing major security challenges and a worsening fiscal situation.

What about the Senate?

The Senate, like the Sejm, is currently controlled by the ruling coalition. Indeed, Tusk has an even larger majority there than in the lower house, making it harder for the opposition to flip. Although the Senate is much weaker than the Sejm – and control of it does not determine who forms the government – it does have some powers that make it a useful asset.

It can slow down the passage of legislation, though not block it. The Senate also must approve the appointment of certain officials, such as the heads of the Supreme Audit Office (NIK) and the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), as well as the Commissioner for Human Rights (RPO).

The upper house is also required to approve proposals by the president to hold national referendums. This year, the Senate has twice blocked moves by Nawrocki to hold a referendum on EU climate policies.

In a situation where Tusk’s coalition controlled the Sejm, and was therefore still in government, but the right-wing opposition held the Senate, that would give the president a powerful tool to call referendums on policies important to him and the opposition.

To that end, there have been calls for the right-wing and far-right opposition to form a so-called Senate pact, of the type that Tusk and his allies used to win control of the upper house in 2019 and 2023.

What that means in practice is that the parties forming the pact agree to stand only one candidate between them in each of the 100 Senate districts, making it more likely that they will scoop up votes from supporters of all the parties in the pact and win the winner-takes-all contest.

What role will Nawrocki play in all of this?

Presidents are in theory expected to be non-partisan. In practice, however, they will seek to boost parties or coalitions aligned with them, and with whom it will be easier to work.

Since Nawrocki was elected last year, relations and cooperation between the president and government have reached unprecedently low levels. Within just 10 months, Nawrocki had vetoed more bills than any previous president in history over their entire terms. He has made it abundantly clear that he would prefer to work with a government formed from the right-wing opposition.

However, the extent to which he will be involved in the election campaign is unclear. Some figures on the right hope that Nawrocki will act as a figurehead, using his positive relations with parties across the right-wing opposition to bring them together.

In practical terms, this could involve him acting as the patron of a Senate pact (something the head of Nawrocki’s cabinet recently said the president was willing to do), as well as helping right-wing parties form a coalition government after the elections.

Nawrocki also continues to enjoy strong approval ratings among the conservative electorate, meaning that his presence during the election campaign could act as a boost for the opposition.

What issues are likely to feature in the campaign?

A major issue will be the question of sovereignty. The right-wing opposition accuses Tusk of being Brussels’ and Berlin’s lapdog, handing over ever more power to the EU and prioritising Germany’s interests over Poland’s.

The ruling coalition, meanwhile, argues that PiS is too beholden to the Trump administration and warns that the opposition is pushing Poland towards “Polexit” from the EU, which would leave the country isolated and vulnerable, as well as much poorer.

Those battle lines extend to security policy too, with the Tusk government shifting emphasis towards Europe as a defence partner but PiS insisting that only the US can truly guarantee Poland’s security. Poland’s desire to host a new permanent US military base has already become highly politicised. If progress stalls, the opposition will blame the government. If Washington confirms that the base will go ahead, Nawrocki will seek to take the credit, based on his good relationship with Trump.

On this point, though, it is worth noting the split within the opposition. While PiS and Rozwój Plus are strongly pro-American, Confederation and, to an even greater extent, KKP, are opposed to a greater US presence in Poland.

Where the right-wing opposition has been united, however, is on pushing for a tougher position towards Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees in Poland.

While tensions have calmed significantly since the crisis sparked in May by President Volodymyr Zelensky naming a military unit after a group that massacred Poles in World War Two, it is likely that relations with Ukraine and the large-scale presence of Ukrainians in Poland will remain important issues during the election campaign.

The ruling coalition, meanwhile, will be keen to emphasise its tough overall approach to immigration, which it says was out of control under the former PiS government. It can point to the falling number of new residence permits being issued, the growing number of deportations, and tougher measures on the Belarus border, including a ban on asylum claims.

The economy, public finances and cost of living are also likely to be major issues.

As long as the current global energy crisis sparked by the conflict around Iran continues, the opposition will seek to place the blame for record fuel prices on the government. They will also cite large deficits and the ballooning public debt as evidence that Tusk is mismanaging the economy.

The ruling coalition will point to continued strong economic growth and blame Nawrocki, who has vetoed revenue-generating tax bills, for the fiscal situation.

Daniel Tilles

Daniel Tilles is editor-in-chief of Notes from Poland. He has written on Polish affairs for a wide range of publications, including Foreign Policy, POLITICO Europe, EUobserver and Dziennik Gazeta Prawna.

Thank you for standing against racism. This is one of the only places on the Internet where racism against Indians is not there. Everywhere I go, I see racism justified because they happen to belong to a certain group. But not here. I never felt anything close to negativity against me here. It's one of the most wonderful places on the Internet where we can all be together. Thank you all (including all the mods) who have fought against racism .I hope nothing changes here

Relevance to the sub: growing influence of Russia in Africa, review of one of the successful "Gen Z protests" of the 2020s

One year ago, the Malagasy youth rose up in anger against power cuts, poverty, economic mismanagement and corruption attributed to President Andry Rajoelina, launching largely decentralized protests organized on Discord and Telegram, mimicking similar uprisings in Nepal, Bangladesh, Thailand or Indonesia to demand the resignation of the ruling elites.

The protests turned deadly when security forces opened fire on the crowds, and Madagascar spiralled into severe unrest until the elite combat unit CAPSAT led by Colonel Michaël Randrianirina carried out a coup d'etat on October 12 against the government, dissolving the main institutions and suspending the Constitution as President Rajoelina was exfiltrated by the French Armed Forces to the United Arab Emirates to avoid a public lynching.

Initially responsive to the protesters' demands, Col. Randrianirina has since locked down power around himself, transitioning to civilian clothes after a year of "political transition" that will on paper end with presidential elections in October 2027.

On the domestic level, little has changed since the coup - the protesters who led the revolution have largely been relegated to a consulting position, and some of them were even arrested for dissenting against the new authorities. The root causes of the anger, access to electricity, water and education remain largely unaddressed.

The most striking shift has occurred on the geopolitical level: considered an ally of the Western bloc since the fall of the Marxist-Leninist dictatorship after the end of the Cold War, Madagascar had built strong relationships with the United States, France, the United Kingdom but also China and India for military and economic cooperation.

But since Randrianirina's 2025 coup, Madagascar has operated a swift rapprochement with Moscow: according to the OSINT organization All Eyes on Wagner, the GRU has established strong ties with the new Malagasy authorities and flew military personnel of the paramilitary Africa Corps into the country for mutual training. Russia was also reported to have delivered shipments of military equipment - drones, helicopters or vehicles presented as "donations".

A growing relationship between Madagascar and Russia would be mutually beneficial: a cash-stripped Madagascar would benefit from injections of Russian money and Randrianirina's regime from additional security guarantees to cement his reign, while Russia would benefit from access to ports on strategic shipping routes across the Indian Ocean and the Mozambique Channel - and possibly the recruitment of Malagasy people to aid its war effort against Ukraine.

Submission Statement: Illegal crossings at the US-Mexico border stopped by US agents hit its lowest level this year since 1968, according to US data, after tougher policies under President Donald Trump transformed migration across the Americas. The US Department of Homeland Security on Friday reported 98,708 apprehensions of people crossing the southern US border between ports of entry in the year to the end of September.

That is down from more than 2mn people in 2022 and 2023 under Joe Biden. Experts and migrants say that under the previous president people saw a more welcoming environment as an opportunity to escape political, economic and security crises in countries including Haiti and Venezuela.

The fall in crossings began at the end of Biden’s presidency after he put in place rules that made it harder to claim asylum, with Mexico’s government also deploying increased forces in a crackdown.

But under Trump the decline quickened. He largely dismantled the US asylum system for those arriving at the southern border and accompanied the policy with an aggressive deportation campaign inside the country.

Many migrants are not leaving their countries of origin, while others are choosing to stay in Mexico, which takes a tough stance on economic migrants but has a relatively broad policy for asylum seekers.

Declining migration into the US has caused the issue to fall down the ranks of voters’ priorities ahead of November’s midterm elections, with polls showing the economy and the cost of living among the top concerns.

Conflicting traffic figures and competing claims of control are making it increasingly difficult to establish what’s happening in the Strait of Hormuz, even as attacks on merchant shipping intensify.

The true extent of attacks on merchant ships in the Strait of Hormuz remains unclear, with a new report from UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) acknowledging that most vessels struck in the region are not reporting incidents directly to the maritime security organization.

The admission comes as the United States and Iran offer sharply different accounts of who controls the vital waterway, while conflicting transit figures raise further questions about how much commercial shipping has actually recovered.

In its weekly overview published Friday, UKMTO said it is struggling to establish the true number of attacks because the majority of vessels targeted are refusing to submit reports.

UKMTO said it is aware of additional incidents through other sources but cannot include them in its reporting without sufficient verification.

The disclosure raises questions about the reliability of publicly available attack statistics, particularly following a sharp escalation in strikes against commercial vessels over the past two weeks.

UKMTO recorded 12 attacks during its latest reporting period, including 10 in the Strait of Hormuz, one in the Arabian Gulf and one in the Gulf of Oman. Six vessels continued their voyages or reached port, two were disabled or left not under command, and three had unconfirmed damage or outcomes. One vessel, the Singapore-flagged containership GFS Pride, was lost after being struck by a projectile.

The report also found that 55 of 74 documented projectile strikes since July 6 occurred along the southern route through the strait, accounting for nearly three-quarters of the reported attacks.

The findings stand in contrast to increasingly confident statements from U.S. military officials about their control of the waterway.

In a video statement Friday, Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of U.S. Central Command, said American forces and regional partners remain firmly in control of the strait despite continued Iranian attacks.

“Let me be clear: the Strait of Hormuz is controlled by the United States and our regional partners, not Iran. And it remains open for business,” Cooper said.

He reported that approximately 400 merchant ships had transited the strait over the preceding seven days, while U.S. forces helped Gulf partners move more than 100 million barrels of crude oil during the same period. Cooper said those shipments added to more than 1.3 billion barrels of crude transported with U.S. assistance in recent months.

But the latest UKMTO figures paint a different picture.

For the seven days ending October 14, UKMTO recorded 254 combined transits, including 129 inbound and 125 outbound movements. That was down from 275 the previous week, with traffic remaining approximately 70% below pre-conflict levels.

Of those 254 movements, just 42 were observed through Automatic Identification System (AIS) data. The remaining 212 were drawn from U.S.-reported facilitated transits, which include ships operating without broadcasting AIS.

UKMTO cautioned that the U.S.-supplied figures and associated totals cannot currently be independently verified.

Cooper did not specify the exact dates covered by his 400-transit figure, leaving open the possibility that the difference reflects separate reporting periods or counting methods. Nevertheless, the gap illustrates the difficulty of establishing a consistent picture of commercial traffic through the strait.

Iran, meanwhile, continues to dispute Washington’s account of control over the waterway. Iranian army chief Maj. Gen. Amir Hatami said Thursday that the strait would remain closed until the rights of the Iranian people were respected.

The latest Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) advisory, published October 15, describes both a northern Iranian-controlled route and a southern Omani corridor, while warning that ships operating with AIS switched on face an elevated risk of targeting and instructions to divert toward the Iranian route.

UKMTO’s latest report adds that most vessels broadcasting AIS continue to use the Iranian route, even as U.S.-facilitated traffic accounts for the majority of reported transits.

The competing accounts reflect the increasingly complicated security environment for merchant shipping. U.S. forces are facilitating substantial traffic through the strait, while Iran continues to demonstrate an ability to strike vessels, including those using the southern corridor.

And with UKMTO now acknowledging that most attacked vessels are not reporting incidents directly, even the growing number of documented strikes may offer only a partial picture of the dangers facing seafarers.

The order to limit a satellite system used by Ukraine ​for battlefield communications and drone operations came from inside the White House, according to two US officials and a Western official briefed on the matter.

The officials said ‌leaders at the Defense Department received a message that the SpaceX Starshield service for the Ukrainian military needed to be slowed.

The officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, did not specify who in the White House made the decision or who was responsible for implementing the order. The Pentagon is the biggest customer of Starshield, which is the military-grade version of the Starlink service.

Ukrainian officials said this week that military-grade Starlink receptors stopped working in Ukraine ​when mounted on fast-moving objects, interfering with the performance of Ukrainian drones that rely on them for onboard guidance systems over Ukrainian territory.

A person in Ukraine's Defence Ministry said on ​Thursday that the receptors were now working when in motion, but only at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour (160 kph).

US PRESSURES UKRAINE ⁠OVER REFINERY ATTACKS

The move to temporarily restrict the vital communications system came as President Donald Trump has pressured Kyiv to stop its attacks on Russian refineries, which he has blamed for the ​soaring energy prices that are denting his Republican Party's prospects in the November midterm elections.

But experts say that surge in energy costs is mainly the result of the US-Israeli war with Iran, which brought Iranian ​attacks on energy facilities and has largely shut the vital Strait of Hormuz.

In response to a request for comment about the order to limit Starshield, a senior US official said: "No such request was ever made by the president."

The White House did not respond to questions about whether other administration officials might have made the request.

Starshield was developed by SpaceX specifically for government and national-security customers, particularly the US Department of Defense. Starshield uses the Starlink ​constellation as its backbone.

Ukrainian officials said the restrictions complicated strike missions against Russian forces and logistics in occupied territory and slowed interceptor drones used to shoot down incoming Russian Shahed drones.

Elon Musk, ​the CEO of SpaceX, said on X on Wednesday that because Starshield systems are owned and controlled by the US government, any limits on speed or usage are decided by the US military or the president.

SpaceX ‌did not respond ⁠to a request for comment.

The Department of Defense and the Ukrainian embassy in Washington also did not respond to requests for comment.

DECLINE IN RELATIONS

Relations between Kyiv and Washington have deteriorated in recent days following a meeting in Miami on October 9 that convened representatives from both countries as well as Europe and the World Bank.

Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, the Trump administration’s Middle East envoy, struck a tough tone with Ukraine in the meeting, according to a separate person familiar with the matter. They told Ukrainian officials that the US was frustrated with Kyiv's continued strikes on Russian ​refineries despite repeated requests from Washington to stop.

The ​US delegation also explained Washington's decision to ⁠strike a diesel deal with Russia, saying the White House hoped it would soften Moscow's stance on peace talks.

That deal, under which Russia will supply more than 2.25 million barrels of diesel to US and global markets, has triggered a backlash from some US lawmakers, who say it will give Moscow ​cash to pursue its war without forcing Russian President Vladimir Putin to make concessions to end the conflict.

In the days that followed, Ukrainian ​President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and Trump ⁠criticized each other, with Zelenskiy calling the US decision on the Russian diesel deal "weak." Trump called for elections in Ukraine and Zelenskiy's ouster.

Behind the scenes, American officials threatened to stop providing intelligence to Kyiv about Russian missile launches that Ukraine uses to thwart attacks, as Reuters previously reported. Trump said on Tuesday Washington was still sharing intelligence with Ukraine.

Following the move to restrict Ukraine's access to Starshield, the Ukrainians made calls on ⁠Tuesday and ​Wednesday to find answers from senior officials at the White House, State Department and Pentagon, a senior Ukrainian official said, ​adding that Kyiv was told it was a White House decision.

The Pentagon has spent billions of dollars on the Starlink and Starshield services. It has also bought dedicated Starshield satellites, including communications spacecraft for missile-warning missions and a spy constellation for ​the National Reconnaissance Office, Reuters reported in 2024.

On Oct. 8 in New York City, an ICE officer in street clothes approached a stopped car with his gun drawn. When the driver began to pull forward, officers opened fire on the vehicle. Inside were 28-year-old Oscar Belgal and his five-year-old son. One of the rounds struck Belgal in the neck. He survived, and ICE took him into custody.

Two days later, on Oct. 10, footage from a Houston shopping center showed an unmarked ICE vehicle veering across a parking lot in pursuit of Miguel Parra-Hernandez, a 48-year-old Mexican man who was fleeing on foot. The vehicle ran him down, leaving him with fractures requiring multiple surgeries. He wasn’t even the man ICE was looking for; Parra-Hernandez’s family says he has lived in the United States for nearly 30 years and was on his way to work. The local district attorney believes the agent hit Parra-Hernandez intentionally, but the agent drove the vehicle away before its crash data could be examined.

Scenes like these—carried out in broad daylight by armed agents who wear everyday clothes, operate unmarked vehicles, and answer to no local authority—rightly provoke widespread outrage. Far less attention is given to the deaths that happen inside ICE detention facilities, where nobody is filming and where the administration has worked hard to keep watchdogs out.

In March 2025, DHS shut down the two internal offices that investigated detention complaints. It has also repeatedly turned away members of Congress who showed up at ICE facilities for unannounced inspections, even though federal law prohibits DHS from blocking such visits. (When DHS began requiring a week’s notice—which obviously defeats the purpose of a surprise inspection—a federal judge blocked that rule. DHS then quietly reinstated it in a private memo, and the court blocked it again.)

Deaths in ICE custody are now at their highest level in more than two decades. In 2025, at least 32 people died in ICE custody, and 2026 is on pace to surpass that, with more than two dozen deaths by mid-September. One of the most recent was Julian Curo-Churata, a 47-year-old Peruvian man who had lived in Maryland for 17 years. He died on Sept. 29 after ICE found him “in medical distress” at a Louisiana facility.

This spike is not simply a byproduct of ICE holding more people. One report found that the mortality rate in ICE detention—deaths per 10,000 people held on an average day—has more than doubled since Trump’s second term began. An investigation by the San Francisco Chronicle found that 17 of the 32 deaths whose case files it reviewed were the result of delayed or inadequate medical care.

Even these figures are almost certainly an undercount because ICE has changed how it records detainee deaths. In 2021, the Biden administration began requiring ICE to report deaths that occurred within 30 days of a detainee’s release. In June, Trump’s DHS scrapped that rule, and ICE now reports only deaths that occur while someone is in its custody. That means ICE can release severely ill detainees—including those whose illness was caused or exacerbated by detention—shortly before they die and keep those deaths off its books.

There are known cases when ICE has used this tactic. Jose Chajon-Raxon, a Guatemalan immigrant in New Jersey, had a seizure the day after being arrested by ICE. He was taken to a hospital, and after three days ICE released him from custody. He later died, but ICE never disclosed it; his death came to light only weeks later. Rep. Rob Menendez, a New Jersey Democrat, accused ICE of trying to “wash their hands clean.” Chajon-Raxon was the third death linked to Delaney Hall, an ICE detention center in Newark, where 300 detainees signed a letter alleging that the seriously ill were being denied proper medical care.

Nor do the official figures capture miscarriages. ICE is detaining a record number of pregnant women, and it logged 18 miscarriages in the first nine months of Trump’s second term. Then it stopped counting. After ICE ended its contract with the Veterans Affairs office that handled its medical billing, DHS said it “does not have data on miscarriages from October 2025 through June 2026.”

None of this has slowed the administration’s push to expand detention and put even more lives at risk. The ACLU reports that ICE is converting shuttered federal prisons and leasing warehouse space nationwide, aiming to hold 96,600 people at any given time, up from a record 73,000 in January.

This will almost certainly lead to more deaths in ICE facilities. These deaths fall into three broad categories.

Deaths from Inhumane Conditions

There is ample evidence of inhumane conditions in ICE detention facilities leading to deaths. An investigative report from the office of Sen. Jon Ossoff, a Georgia Democrat, documented over 1,000 credible reports of human rights violations during the first year of Trump’s second term, including mistreatment of children and pregnant women, sleep deprivation, physical and sexual abuse, inadequate food and water, overcrowding, and exposure to extreme temperatures. Before Florida’s “Alligator Alcatraz” closed in June, the DHS inspector general made an unannounced inspection. Its report, released months after its closure, found that the facility failed to comply with national standards for medical care, food service, and hygiene, among other violations. At least on one occasion staff held detainees in cages of about 18 square feet, roughly the size of a phone booth, as punishment.

Poor conditions can contribute to rising fatality rates in at least two ways: by creating or exacerbating illnesses that would not have occurred in appropriate conditions, and by contributing to detainee suicides.

At least 10 detainees died by suicide between January 2025 and May 2026, a dramatic spike for an agency that typically recorded one or none per year. An Associated Press investigation found delayed or refused mental health care and inadequate monitoring of detainees. Detainees at Camp East Montana, which is part of the Fort Bliss Army base in El Paso and is the nation’s largest detention facility, have said that squalid conditions and brutal treatment led them to consider suicide. The ACLU is suing over what it calls “a civil rights catastrophe” at the camp.

The tragic case of Brayan Rayo-Garzon, a Colombian military veteran whose death was the first in a spike of detainee suicides, shows how these failures compound. At the Missouri county jail where ICE held him, his initial medical screening took 35 hours. His mental health appointment was canceled twice: first for lack of “mental health clinic time and staff,” then because he had COVID. Moved into an isolation cell, he slid notes under the door asking to call his mother. “I know you have family, and you know that they worry about us,” he wrote to the guards. “God bless you.” He never got the appointment or the call. Within an hour of a guard collecting one of his notes, he was found unconscious in his cell. He died at a hospital in April 2025.

Detention conditions are also spreading disease. ICE returned a detainee with tuberculosis to Delaney Hall without a plan to contain the infection, according to a physician. The New York Times reports unsafe meals, unsanitary food preparation workspaces, and dirty and overcrowded living spaces at that facility. Several other facilities have had outbreaks of tuberculosis. Camp East Montana suffered a measles outbreak that forced 112 detainees to be isolated.

As ICE packs more people into detention and general healthcare conditions worsen, expect more illness and more deaths.

Deaths from Withheld or Delayed Treatment

Consider the case of Fernando Viera Reyes, a 50-year-old man currently being held at the largest immigration detention center in California. He had tests taken during an earlier detention that revealed signs of prostate cancer—but when he asked for pain medication, a doctor prescribed vitamin C and staff told him to buy himself some Tylenol. It took five months to get him a biopsy. Viera Reyes recounted his experience: “For months, I couldn’t move, sleep, or even use the bathroom without being in extreme pain. It wasn’t until we filed this class action lawsuit and had a court order that staff at California City finally got me to a specialist.” When the diagnosis finally came, it was metastatic prostate cancer, meaning it had already spread beyond the prostate. Prostate cancer is curable when caught early, but much less so after it has metastasized, as it has in Viera Reyes’s case. Other detainees likewise report being denied insulin and heart medication to manage chronic conditions. Earlier this year, a federal judge felt compelled to order the government to provide adequate medical care—but several months later, a court-appointed monitor found that ICE still wasn’t complying.

ICE’s own reviewers have reached similar conclusions. In late September, the agency posted internal reviews of 33 detainee deaths dating back to 2019, then quietly pulled them. Of the 31 reviews that reached a conclusion, 27 found that care had fallen outside “the safe limits of practice.” In the case of Marie Ange Blaise, staff monitored her rather than performing CPR, “despite Ms. Blaise’s pulselessness.”

Emmanuel Damas, a Haitian man who came to the U.S. legally during the Biden administration, was taken into ICE custody in September 2025. Months later, he died of a severe tooth infection that a medical examiner’s report stated came from dental cavities and untreated tooth disease. He reported a severe toothache but his brother says ICE did not take Damas’ complaints seriously.

Carlos Josué Marchena-Marchena, from Costa Rica, repeatedly complained of missing insulin shots and meals, as well as insufficient water, to manage his Type 1 diabetes. He died last month.

Ismael Ayala-Uribe, 39, was brought to the United States when he was four years old. ICE took him into custody in August 2025. His requests for treatment of a painful abscess were ignored for days, and by the time he was admitted for sepsis, it was too late. He died the following month. Weeks before he arrived at California’s Adelanto ICE Processing Center, ICE had waived the facility’s requirement that detainees receive a full health assessment within 14 days. An internal ICE review later found that his care “deviated beyond safe limits of practice.”

Homicide Deaths

One death in ICE custody has been ruled a homicide: Geraldo Lunas Campos, a 55-year-old Cuban migrant being held in Camp East Montana, died in January 2026. A fellow detainee reported that Lunas Campos was already handcuffed when at least five guards pinned him to the floor and one put him in a chokehold until he lost consciousness. “The last thing he said was that he couldn’t breathe,” according to the witness. ICE initially reported that Lunas Campos died after “experiencing medical distress,” then changed its story to attempted suicide. The autopsy report classified his death as homicide from asphyxiation to “neck and torso compression.”

Families of other detainees have raised questions about the circumstances of their deaths. Chaofeng Ge, a 32-year-old Chinese citizen and a resident of New York City, was found hanging in August 2025 and the death was ruled a suicide. But his autopsy found that his hands and feet were “hog-tied.” The autopsy also noted signs of defensive trauma, and an internal ICE review found that staff delayed life-saving measures by about five minutes after finding him. His family has filed a FOIA lawsuit seeking further information on his death and the conditions of his detention.

Victor Manuel Diaz, who was also being held in Camp East Montana, was also declared a “presumed suicide” by ICE. But rather than send Diaz’s body to the El Paso County medical examiner, which ruled Lunas Campos’ death a homicide, ICE snuck it to a military hospital that does not publicly release autopsy results. The family wasn’t told about the transfer; by the time their attorney tracked down the body, the autopsy had already been performed. The family learned of ICE’s suicide finding from the news. Diaz’s family members say they do not believe Diaz took his own life, and their attorney is seeking answers.

Families of other detainees have raised questions about the circumstances of their deaths. Chaofeng Ge, a 32-year-old Chinese citizen and a resident of New York City, was found hanging in August 2025 and the death was ruled a suicide. But his autopsy found that his hands and feet were “hog-tied.” The autopsy also noted signs of defensive trauma, and an internal ICE review found that staff delayed life-saving measures by about five minutes after finding him. His family has filed a FOIA lawsuit seeking further information on his death and the conditions of his detention.

Victor Manuel Diaz, who was also being held in Camp East Montana, was also declared a “presumed suicide” by ICE. But rather than send Diaz’s body to the El Paso County medical examiner, which ruled Lunas Campos’ death a homicide, ICE snuck it to a military hospital that does not publicly release autopsy results. The family wasn’t told about the transfer; by the time their attorney tracked down the body, the autopsy had already been performed. The family learned of ICE’s suicide finding from the news. Diaz’s family members say they do not believe Diaz took his own life, and their attorney is seeking answers.

UK reform party members call for King Charles to be beheaded because he is a “Muslim”.

Source: https://www.lbc.co.uk/article/reform-sting-racism-councillors-5HjdjxD_2/

Question, why do British far-right hate their king ?

AfD politicians are facing off against each other with swords

The AfD in North Rhine-Westphalia is embroiled in a bitter factional struggle. Now, two party officials are set to face off in a duel. The challenge to duel was issued at a party convention.

This Saturday, blood is likely to be shed at the fraternity house of the Alte Hallesche Burschenschaft Rhenania-Salingia: Two fraternity members will face off in a duel. It is a ritual that fraternities have practiced for centuries. In the past, it sometimes resulted in deaths; today, it takes place with protective gear to prevent fatalities.

Two members of different student fraternities will face off in a fencing duel. The eyes, nose, neck, and torso are protected, but the face and head—of all places—remain exposed; they are the target area, the opponent’s aim. Anyone who shows fear, who flinches, or who cries out in pain when struck risks losing the match.

What makes this Saturday’s Mensur special is that, on the so-called “Paukboden,” it’s not just two members of different fraternities facing off as usual—but two AfD officials who belong to the two opposing factions in the party’s fierce internal struggle in North Rhine-Westphalia.

A member of the AfD NRW described this as “absolute madness” in an interview with t-online. “They’re not 21 anymore; they’re elected officials, they’re family men. This is crazy!”

AfD City Council Members Cross Swords

On one side on Saturday will be Matthias Büschges—he has represented the AfD on the Cologne City Council for eleven years and serves as the party’s caucus leader there. In 2025, he ran as the AfD’s candidate for mayor of North Rhine-Westphalia’s largest city. He belongs to the camp of Martin Vincentz, the relatively moderate AfD state leader in North Rhine-Westphalia, and is a member of the Cologne fraternity Alemannia.

On the other side will be Jeremy Franosch. He serves on the AfD’s council caucus in Düsseldorf. Within the AfD’s internal power struggle, the Düsseldorf chapter is considered a stronghold of supporters of far-right extremist Matthias Helferich, who serves in the Bundestag for the AfD and is the party’s cultural policy spokesperson there. Franosch is a member of the Düsseldorf fraternity Rhenania-Salingia.

Vincentz and Helferich have long been engaged in a bitter power struggle within the party, in which ideology now plays only a secondary role. This year, the conflict has reached its peak so far. The rift between the two camps is deep, and the tone is harsh. It is reported that there have already been not only insults but also physical assaults. In May, state executive committee member Sabine Reinknecht filed a police report for assault against a fellow party member.

A duel with swords, however—that is a first even for the AfD in North Rhine-Westphalia.

Büschges challenged Franosch at a party convention

Although both Büschges and Franosch emphasized, when asked by t-online, that the duel was a private matter, neither is willing to comment further on what triggered it. So-called “duels of honor”—duels intended to settle disputes over honor—have long been banned in German fraternities. However, there are indications that this involves more than just a purely athletic competition and that factional rivalry may also be playing a role.

According to information from t-online, Büschges challenged Franosch to a duel at the AfD NRW nomination convention in Marl for the 2027 state legislative elections. The nomination convention spanned two weekends in July and completely escalated: Representatives from both camps shouted at each other, hurled insults, and physically obstructed one another during the drawing up of the candidate list. AfD officials subsequently described the event as a “party convention of shame.”

Participants report that a lot of beer was consumed in this atmosphere. Büschges, who was reportedly intoxicated, is said to have clashed with Franosch and ultimately challenged him to a duel.

Franosch confirmed that a challenge to a duel took place during the AfD nomination meeting. “I cannot pass a definitive judgment on Mr. Büschges’s motivation for doing this,” he told t-online. However, as a “member of a fraternity and a student fencer,” he said it was far from his nature to resolve political conflicts through a duel. “After all, that’s what party conventions are for—and in my party, they’re far more exhausting than any fencing match.”

For him, the athletic competition is the main focus; it is a “private matter,” Franosch continued. However: “Party friends with whom I keep in touch wished me ‘Waffenschwein,’” said Franosch. The wish for “Waffenschwein” is comparable to saying “Good luck.”

Büschges kept his response brief: “That’s a private matter; it has nothing to do with the party.”

“Personal Duel” Following “More Intense Use of Fists”

What may seem archaic follows strict rules—the so-called “Comment”—and has its own distinct vocabulary. The two “duelists” facing off must meet certain requirements—for example, both must designate a ‘Kartellträger’ to handle communication, as well as a “Paukarzt” to provide medical care in case of injury.

AfD state leader Martin Vincentz is a doctor. Does he know about the Mensur—and might he be serving as the Paukarzt? He was not asked, has therefore not agreed to participate, and does not support the action, Vincentz told t-online in response to an inquiry. “Politics means peaceful solutions and an intellectual crossing of swords.”

However, another person close to Vincentz is closely involved with the duel. Kris Schnappertz—who now goes by the name Kris von Gierke—serves as Büschges’s second. Until mid-2025, he was the press secretary for the AfD state chapter and the parliamentary caucus, and until then, he was Vincentz’s right-hand man.

A large crowd of “spectators” is expected

In correspondence regarding the duel, which t-online has obtained, Franosch’s Kartellträger writes to Büschges: “Following your personal challenge issued in Marl on Sunday, July 12, against my fraternity brother Franosch, I hereby declare my role as Kartellträger and confirm your challenge.” The duel is to take place according to “stricter dueling customs” “at the Rhenania-Salingia clubhouse,” and Büschges is to declare in advance which arm he will use to fence.

Büschges’s duel representative, Kris von Gierke, replied on his behalf: Büschges would be “ready for the personal challenge” on October 17. The opposing side was to “provide a dueling hall of sufficient size.” A “large number of spectators” was to be expected.

The so-called “Knattern” is a regular feature of such events, during which members of the two fraternities engage in a verbal exchange ranging from humorous to hostile. This is also evident in the letters: For example, Kris von Gierke states that he is surprised his opponent is not properly observing the “Comment.” He would be happy to conduct a “Fuchsenstunde” “so that such embarrassments are avoided in the future.” A “Fuchs” is a new member of a fraternity who has not yet attained full membership.

In the end, they reach an agreement: The Mensur is to take place on Saturday afternoon, October 17. Both opponents will fence with their right arms.

Kris Schnappertz has confirmed to t-online that he is now Kris von Gierke. His parents have been divorced for nearly 30 years, and he had long wanted to take his mother’s surname. “Thanks to the new name law, that was now possible.” He does not wish to comment publicly on the dueling match, but emphasizes: “ The duel is a private matter and has nothing to do with internal party conflicts.”

Nevertheless, the confrontation is likely to be a highlight for both the AfD in North Rhine-Westphalia and the two fraternities involved, as indicated by the number of expected “spectators.” The injuries sustained in such a duel are considered badges of honor. Against the backdrop of the factional struggle, this is likely to be even more true.

India has some of the least flexible labor laws in the world, with stricter limits on weekly hours and overtime pay than many developed country. This causes manufacturing to take longer, cost more, and be less adaptive to changes in demand.

Submission Statement: This is relevant to rNeoliberal since it deal with government regulations and its impacts on economic development for the global poor, two issues users care about.

Submission statement: The role of screens and digital presence in the youth mental health crisis seems to be an ever hotter topic all around the globe. Advocates like academic psychologist Jonathan Haidt have proposed strict regulations by the state and parents, but while support seems high, few such policies have actually been implemented.

Summary: A child psychiatrist argues that scientific evidence does not support limiting screens.